Firm Alert
(by Ben Clapp and Gary Steinbauer)
President Trump’s first-day executive actions prioritize the development of a wide-range of domestic energy resources and take direct aim at the climate initiatives and environmental justice priorities of the Biden administration. With the declaration of a national energy emergency, President Trump has required the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal agencies to review numerous agency actions and authorities with the goal of “unleashing American energy.” These first-day executive actions do not themselves implement the desired changes, but the environmental ripple effects and legal challenges stemming from these initial actions will unfold in the weeks, months, and years ahead and are likely to involve nearly every major federal environmental law. In this Alert, we summarize key federal environmental regulatory, permitting, and enforcement implications from President Trump’s initial executive actions.
- Review of Existing Regulations and Regulatory Freeze. EPA and other federal regulatory agencies are ordered to review and identify existing regulations and policies that unduly burden domestic energy resources and develop and begin implementing plans to expeditiously suspend, revise, or rescind the identified regulations and policies. The universe of agency actions that must be reviewed include those related to the production of oil, natural gas, coal, hydropower, biofuels, critical mineral, and nuclear energy resources.[1] Regulations and policies that unduly burden domestic mining and processing of non-fuel minerals are also covered by this mandate.[2] As is customary for a new administration, President Trump has issued a regulatory freeze designed to pause certain types of pending regulatory actions until new leadership at EPA and other agencies have an opportunity to review such actions.[3] More information regarding potential EPA rules that may be subject to the regulatory freeze can be found in this separate Alert.
- Environmental Regulatory Litigation and Enforcement Implications. President Trump directed EPA and other agencies to identify unduly burdensome agency actions that are the subject of pending litigation and notify the Attorney General of these actions so that the Attorney General can seek to stay or otherwise delay these lawsuits until challenged regulations can be suspended, revised, or rescinded as ordered.[4] President Trump also ordered EPA to review and identify existing settlements and consent orders that impose an undue burden on identification, development, and use of domestic energy resources. EPA will have 30 days to report any settlements and consent orders to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).[5] Lastly, federal agencies are directed to assess whether enforcement discretion can be utilized to advance the Trump administration’s domestic energy policy.[6]
- Emergency Authorities and Streamlining Permitting for Domestic Energy Projects. President Trump has issued broad mandates to the EPA and other federal resource agencies to identify and use “lawful emergency authorities” to facilitate generation of non-wind domestic energy resources and related infrastructure, including emergency authorities under the Clean Water Act Section 404 permitting program and the Endangered Species Act.[7] President Trump revoked a 1970’s Executive Order giving the White House Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) the authority to issue National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations and directed the CEQ to propose to rescind existing NEPA regulations to expedite and simplify permitting for energy projects.[8] EPA is directed to consider issuing emergency fuel waivers allowing for the year-round sale of E15 gasoline, and the review of applications for liquefied natural gas projects are to be restarted.[9]
- Climate-Related Regulatory Underpinnings and Considerations. President Trump revoked President Biden’s Executive Orders related to climate initiatives.[10] In addition to withdrawing from the Paris Climate Agreement,[11] President Trump directed EPA to abandon the consideration of the “social cost of carbon” in regulatory determinations and submit a recommendation on the fate of the 2009 finding under the Clean Air Act that greenhouse gases threaten public health and welfare, which serves as a necessary statutory prerequisite for EPA to implement greenhouse gas emission standards for motor vehicles and other sectors.[12] All federal agencies are directed to pause clean energy and climate-related funding under the Inflation Reduction Act and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, and the Trump administration has pledged to “eliminate the ‘electric vehicle (EV) mandate.’”[13]
President Trump’s first-day executive actions set the stage for reshaping the federal environmental regulatory, permitting, and enforcement landscape. The actions EPA and other agencies take to implement these new directives will be closely watched and scrutinized.
As always, Babst Calland attorneys are available to provide guidance on how these actions affect your business. For more information on the actions discussed in this Alert or related matters, please contact Ben Clapp at (202) 853-3488 or bclapp@babstcalland.com, Gary Steinbauer at (412) 394-6590 or gsteinbauer@babstcalland.com, or your Babst Calland client relationship attorney.
To view other “Day One” Executive orders issued by the Trump administration affecting energy and environmental policy, please click here.
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[1] Executive Order: Unleashing American Energy, Section 3 (Jan. 20, 2025).
[2] Executive Order: Unleashing American Energy, Section 9(a) (Jan. 20, 2025).
[3] Memorandum: Regulatory Freeze Pending Review (Jan. 20, 2025).
[4] Executive Order: Unleashing American Energy, Section 3(b)-(d) (Jan. 20, 2025); see also Executive Order: Ending the Weaponization of the Federal Government (Jan. 20, 2025), Sec. 3(a) (requiring the Attorney General and heads of all departments and agencies to review civil and criminal enforcement activities over the last 4 years to identify instances where such authority was used to target perceived political opponents).
[5] Executive Order: Unleashing American Energy, Section 3(b) (Jan. 20, 2025).
[6] Executive Order: Unleashing American Energy, Section 7(c) (Jan. 20, 2025).
[7] Executive Order: Declaring a National Emergency, Section 2 (Jan. 20, 2025).
[8] Executive Order: Unleashing American Energy, Section 5 (Jan. 20, 2025).
[9] Executive Order: Declaring a National Emergency, Section 2(b) (Jan. 20, 2025); Executive Order: Unleashing American Energy, Section 8 (Jan. 20, 2025).
[10] Executive Order: Unleashing American Energy, Section 5 (Jan. 20, 2025).
[11] Executive Order: Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements, Section 4.
[12] Executive Order: Unleashing American Energy, Section 6 (Jan. 20, 2025).
[13] Executive Order: Unleashing American Energy, Sections 2(e) and 7 (Jan. 20, 2025).
Environmental Alert
(by Sloane Wildman, Joseph Schaeffer and Jessica Deyoe)
The final year of the Biden administration saw several significant developments related to the regulation of per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances, more commonly known as PFAS. These developments included the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s designation of the two most common PFAS compounds as hazardous substances under federal cleanup laws and its limitation of six PFAS compounds under federal drinking water regulations, among others. The past year also saw a growing number of PFAS-related lawsuits, which are currently in various stages of litigation. What could happen to all these developments in 2025? Can the Trump administration change these rules and policies? What about the numerous PFAS related lawsuits that have been filed in the past year? This update takes a look at some of the more significant PFAS-related developments from the past year and considers what might happen in 2025 and beyond.
What are PFAS and what were the prior administration’s PFAS priorities?
The term “PFAS” encompasses thousands of manmade chemicals. PFAS compounds have been widely used for decades in various applications, including manufacturing water-, stain-, and heat-resistant consumer products, e.g., waterproof clothing and food packaging, and as ingredients in aqueous film forming foams (known as AFFF) used to extinguish certain kinds of chemical fires. There is research indicating that exposure to certain PFAS, which are prevalent and persistent in the environment, may cause various health-related impacts. In an effort to address the impacts related to PFAS, in 2021, the Biden administration published a “PFAS Strategic Roadmap: EPA’s Commitments to Action 2021-2024” identifying a number of regulatory priorities that the administration planned to take during its four-year term. The Strategic Roadmap and annual progress reports are available here.
What were some of the most significant federal regulatory developments in 2024?
Two of EPA’s more significant regulatory actions in 2024 occurred almost back-to-back in April with its designation of two PFAS compounds as hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and its rule imposing regulatory limits on six PFAS compounds under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). We reported on both of these developments in updates available here and here.
Specifically, in April 2024, the EPA published a final rule designating perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctanesulfonic acid (PFOS), and their salts and structural isomers, as “hazardous substances” under CERCLA, available here. As we reported previously, EPA’s designation of PFOA and PFOS as CERCLA hazardous substances was unprecedented and controversial because it was the first time the Agency used its statutory authority under CERCLA to designate a hazardous substance. Until that point, hazardous substances under CERCLA had only been defined by reference to other statutes (e.g., the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act). Among other things, the rule requires parties to report unpermitted releases of PFOA and/or PFOS at or above the applicable “reportable quantity” (one pound or more within a 24-hour period) to federal, state, and local authorities. It also imposes certain obligations on federal agencies when selling and transferring federally owned real property. And most significantly, the rule provides the federal government with additional authority under CERCLA to address PFOA/PFOS contamination in the environment, allows private parties who conduct cleanups consistent with CERCLA’s National Contingency Plan to seek to recover PFAS cleanup costs from other potentially responsible parties (PRPs), and potentially affects closed sites with existing remedies. At the same time EPA published the final CERCLA rule, it issued a policy memorandum, “PFAS Enforcement Discretion and Settlement Policy Under CERCLA” summarizing the Agency’s intent to use its discretion to not “pursue entities where equitable factors do not support seeking response actions or costs under CERCLA . . . .” and generally focus on so-called “major PRPs” – parties who, in EPA’s view, “have played a significant role in releasing or exacerbating the spread of PFAS into the environment, such as those who have manufactured PFAS or used PFAS in the manufacturing process, and other industrial parties.” Some industries that would be protected under this Policy, including publicly owned treatment works and publicly owned/operated municipal solid waste landfills, expressed concern that the policy provides only discretionary rather than mandatory protection and that it does not prevent other PRPs from pursuing claims against them.
Also in April 2024, EPA published a National Primary Drinking Water Regulation establishing the first-ever national enforceable drinking water standards for six PFAS under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), available here. The rule sets enforceable Maximum Contaminant Levels (MCLs) and non-enforceable health-based Maximum Contaminant Level Goals (MCLGs) for PFOA and PFOS, and four additional PFAS compounds – perfluorononanoic acid (PFNA), hexafluoropropylene oxide dimer acid and its ammonium salt (HFPO-DA, commonly known as GenX chemicals), and perfluorohexane sulfonic acid (PFHxS). EPA set MCLs (the maximum concentrations allowed in drinking water that can be delivered to the users of a public water system) at 4.0 parts per trillion (ppt) for PFOA and PFOS and 10 ppt for PFNA, PFHxS and HFPO-DA. In addition, EPA set MCLGs at 0 parts per ppt for PFOA and PFOS and at 10 ppt (same as the enforceable MCL) for PFNA, PFHxS and HFPO-DA. Under the rule, public water systems are given until 2027 to complete initial monitoring of each of the six PFAS, followed by ongoing compliance monitoring, and until 2029 to implement solutions to reduce PFAS where MCLs are exceeded. After those five years, public water systems that exceed one or more of the MCLs must take action to reduce PFAS levels and provide notice to the public of the violation.
In 2024, EPA proposed other rules related to PFAS that have not yet been finalized. For example, in February 2024, EPA published two proposed rules to address PFAS and other emerging contaminants under the authority of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). First, EPA proposed to add nine PFAS (including their salts and structural isomers) to the list of “hazardous constituents” in Appendix VIII of 40 C.F.R. Part 261 that would need to be considered in facility assessments and, where necessary, considered in any further investigation and cleanup through the corrective action. Second, EPA also proposed to clarify, by regulation, that emerging contaminants – including PFAS – can be addressed under RCRA’s Corrective Action Program. For more information about the proposed RCRA rules, see our previous update, available here.
What were some of the major developments in PFAS litigation?
Regulatory developments directly influenced litigation developments. While the regulated community pushed back, plaintiffs’ attorneys relied on the new regulations to identify new targets for litigation and prove the elements of their cases. Overall, the prior year signaled three major developments in PFAS litigation.
First, a variety of stakeholders pushed back at the Biden administration’s efforts to regulate PFAS. In American Water Works Association v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 24-1188 (D.C. Cir. 2024), a coalition of industry and major water utilities challenged the EPA’s regulation of PFAS under the SDWA. They argue that the Agency set MCLs for six PFAS beyond what are technologically and economically feasible and, further, adopted an unprecedented “hazard index” approach to regulating two additional PFAS. And in Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 24-1193 (D.C. Cir. 2024), industry challenged the EPA’s designation of two PFAS as hazardous substances under CERCLA. Emphasizing that the Agency has never before invoked its statutory authority to directly designate hazardous substances under CERCLA, they argue that the Agency conducted an improper “substantial danger” analysis and failed to properly consider the costs and consequences of its regulation. Barring deregulatory action from the Trump administration, both cases are expected to be decided in 2025 and will have major implications for whether and how the EPA may regulate PFAS going forward.
Second, PFAS manufacturers cemented a significant victory when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declined to revisit its opinion in Hardwick v. 3M Co., where it ruled that the district court erred by allowing a “class comprising every person residing in the State of Ohio” to bring claims against ten manufacturers of PFAS for allegedly contaminating their blood with PFAS. Hardwick v. 3M Co., No. 22-3765, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 27, 2023). Holding that the lead plaintiff lacked standing, the Court noted that he “does not know what companies manufactured the particular chemicals in his blood stream; nor does he know, or indeed have much idea, whether those chemicals might someday make him sick; nor, as a result of those chemicals, does he have any sickness or symptoms now.” Id. at *1. Given the ubiquity of PFAS in the environment, and the numerous potential sources of exposure, Hardwick’s legacy may be to raise the bar for standing, causation, and harm in cases alleging PFAS exposure.
And, third, enterprising plaintiffs’ attorneys avoided the standing issues raised in Hardwick by bringing false advertising claims against manufacturers of products alleged to contain PFAS. Relying frequently on state consumer protection laws, the plaintiffs in these cases allege that product manufacturers misled consumers and delivered products that are worth less than they would have been if the presence of PFAS had been disclosed. In one such case filed in late 2024, for instance, the plaintiff alleges that Samsung Electronics failed to disclose the presence of PFAS in bands used with its smart watches, thereby “causing [plaintiff] to overpay for Products” and “enjoy[ing] an unfair competitive advantage, receiving millions of dollars from consumers in ill-gotten proceeds while putting the health and welfare of millions of consumers and their families at risk ….” Class Action Complaint at ¶ 8, Gonzalez v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., No. 2:24-cv-11234 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 31, 2024). Expect these lawsuits to proliferate as government reporting obligations and third-party investigations lead to the discovery of PFAS in products where it was previously unknown to have been used.
What can happen to these rules and cases under the new administration?
On the regulatory front, the Trump administration is expected to deregulate at the federal level and take a less active approach to PFAS than the Biden administration. One major tool that can be used to rescind regulations is the Congressional Review Act (CRA). The first Trump administration liberally used the CRA to rescind regulations issued in the final days of the then-outgoing Obama administration. A “lookback” provision in the CRA allows a new Congress to review and overturn regulations issued during the final sixty legislative days of the prior session – for purposes of the incoming Trump administration, the “lookback” period of the CRA is August 2024. The Biden administration intentionally finalized many regulations, including the PFAS MCLs and designation of PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances under CERCLA, prior to August 2024 to stay out of reach of the CRA.
Though these PFAS-related regulations are out of reach of the CRA “lookback period” for rescinding regulations, there are other tools for doing so. EPA can amend or overturn a rule through ordinary notice and comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. The notice-and-comment rulemaking requires that EPA develop a legal record justifying the proposed change and undergo a lengthy public notice process on the proposed regulatory/deregulatory action. Although it would be time-consuming, the EPA can use this option to amend or overturn the designation of PFOA and PFOS as hazardous substances under CERCLA as well as the PFAS MCLs. Of course, the future of these rules could also be determined by the ongoing litigation discussed above.
Another tool that already has been used by the new Trump administration to direct regulatory action in numerous substantive areas is the issuance of executive orders (EOs). On the first day of his second term, President Trump signed several EOs affecting environmental policy established by the Biden administration, including an EO entitled “Initial Rescissions of Harmful Executive Orders and Actions,” which expressly rescinds a number of Biden administration EOs, including those addressing climate change and environmental justice. Proposed rules and guidance documents, such as the RCRA proposal discussed above, are now subject to President Trump’s EO entitled “Regulatory Freeze Pending Review” which requires that (1) no federal agency propose or issue any rule without review and approval of an agency head appointed or designated by President Trump, and (2) any rule submitted to the Federal Register that is not yet published must be withdrawn pending review. It is also possible that EOs will be issued to withdraw specific guidance documents inconsistent with the new administration’s goals and policies. For example, the EPA’s PFAS Strategic Roadmap could be shelved or rescinded.
These anticipated Trump administration regulatory actions could impact the trajectory of litigation challenging the Safe Drinking Water Act and CERCLA rules, especially if the EPA signals that it intends to withdraw or modify those actions. The private civil litigation, however, is expected to continue unabated.
As the new administration is expected to significantly alter the federal regulatory efforts to address PFAS across multiple program areas, potentially impacting both existing and yet-to-be-filed litigation, Babst Calland attorneys will track these developments and are available to assist you with these matters. For more information on the federal regulatory and litigation developments discussed in this update or related matters, please contact Sloane Wildman at (202) 853-3457 or swildman@babstcalland.com, Joseph Schaeffer at (412) 394-5499 or jschaeffer@babstcalland.com, Jessica Deyoe at (202) 853-3489 or jdeyoe@babstcalland.com or any of our other environmental attorneys. For additional resources and more information on other PFAS developments, please visit Babst Calland’s PFAS Perspectives page, here.
PIOGA eWeekly
(by Chris Farmakis, Susanna Bagdasarova, Kate Cooper, and Dane Fennell)
In recent weeks, significant developments have unfolded regarding the implementation of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) and its beneficial ownership information (BOI) reporting requirements to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which remain subject to a nationwide injunction.
As discussed in our previous Alert, on December 3, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction in Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., et al. v. Garland, et al., temporarily halting enforcement of the CTA and its BOI reporting requirements, including the January 1, 2025, filing deadline. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) appealed, requesting a stay of the injunction or, alternatively, a narrowing of the injunction to apply only to the named plaintiffs and members of the National Federation of Independent Business.
In a flurry of year-end decisions, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted DOJ’s emergency motion on December 23, 2024, lifting the injunction. Three days later, a separate Fifth Circuit panel reversed the earlier decision, vacating the stay and reinstating the nationwide injunction. As a result, FinCEN again updated its guidance, stating that reporting companies may voluntarily submit BOI filings but are not required to do so during the pendency of the injunction.
On December 31, 2024, DOJ filed an emergency “Application for a Stay of the Injunction” with the U.S. Supreme Court, seeking to stay the injunction pending the Fifth Circuit’s review of the matter. Alternatively, DOJ invited the Court to “treat this application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment presenting the question whether the district court erred in entering preliminary relief on a universal basis.”
The ongoing legal challenges have left the status of the BOI reporting requirement in flux. For the time being, unless the Supreme Court intervenes, the nationwide injunction is likely to remain in place through at least March 25, 2025, the scheduled date for oral arguments before the Fifth Circuit. Businesses that have not yet complied with the reporting requirements should remain alert to any changes. If the injunction is lifted, or if the Supreme Court grants a stay, reporting companies may be required to submit their beneficial ownership information promptly, subject to any deadline extensions provided by FinCEN. In the meantime, voluntary submissions of BOI reports to FinCEN are still accepted, but companies should be prepared to meet any new deadlines should the situation change. The next few months could prove critical for the future of the CTA and its enforcement.
Babst Calland will continue to closely monitor developments on this matter. Please reach out to fincenassist@babstcalland.com or your Babst Calland client relationship lawyer if you have any questions.
To view the full article, click here.
Reprinted with permission from the January 2025 issue of The PIOGA Press. All rights reserved.
Firm Alert
(by Chris Farmakis, Susanna Bagdasarova, Kate Cooper, and Dane Fennell)
In recent weeks, significant developments have unfolded regarding the implementation of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) and its beneficial ownership information (BOI) reporting requirements to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which remain subject to a nationwide injunction.
As discussed in our previous Alert, on December 3, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction in Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., et al. v. Garland, et al., temporarily halting enforcement of the CTA and its BOI reporting requirements, including the January 1, 2025, filing deadline. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) appealed, requesting a stay of the injunction or, alternatively, a narrowing of the injunction to apply only to the named plaintiffs and members of the National Federation of Independent Business.
In a flurry of year-end decisions, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted DOJ’s emergency motion on December 23, 2024, lifting the injunction. Three days later, a separate Fifth Circuit panel reversed the earlier decision, vacating the stay and reinstating the nationwide injunction. As a result, FinCEN again updated its guidance, stating that reporting companies may voluntarily submit BOI filings but are not required to do so during the pendency of the injunction.
On December 31, 2024, DOJ filed an emergency “Application for a Stay of the Injunction” with the U.S. Supreme Court, seeking to stay the injunction pending the Fifth Circuit’s review of the matter. Alternatively, DOJ invited the Court to “treat this application as a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment presenting the question whether the district court erred in entering preliminary relief on a universal basis.”
The ongoing legal challenges have left the status of the BOI reporting requirement in flux. For the time being, unless the Supreme Court intervenes, the nationwide injunction is likely to remain in place through at least March 25, 2025, the scheduled date for oral arguments before the Fifth Circuit. Businesses that have not yet complied with the reporting requirements should remain alert to any changes. If the injunction is lifted, or if the Supreme Court grants a stay, reporting companies may be required to submit their beneficial ownership information promptly, subject to any deadline extensions provided by FinCEN. In the meantime, voluntary submissions of BOI reports to FinCEN are still accepted, but companies should be prepared to meet any new deadlines should the situation change. The next few months could prove critical for the future of the CTA and its enforcement.
Babst Calland will continue to closely monitor developments on this matter. Please reach out to fincenassist@babstcalland.com or your Babst Calland client relationship lawyer if you have any questions.
GO-WV
(by Kip Power)
The federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently proposed to approve the application of the State of West Virginia (through its Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP)) to obtain primary authority (a.k.a., “primacy”) over the issuance of permits for Class VI underground injection wells located within its borders. 89 Fed. Reg. 93538 (Nov. 27, 2024). The federal rulemaking proposal may be found here. Comments on the proposed approval are due on or before December 30, 2024. On the same day, EPA will hold a public hearing on the proposal at the Charleston Marriott Town Center, 200 Lee Street East, in Charleston, West Virginia. Details regarding public participation in the rulemaking may be found here.
Class VI underground injection control (UIC) wells are those wells used for injecting carbon dioxide for the purpose of permanent geologic storage or “sequestration.” WVDEP’s rules for such permits are largely modeled on EPA’s detailed “Class VI” UIC regulations promulgated under the federal Safe Drinking Water Act. If approved, West Virginia will be just the fourth state to receive primacy over the Class VI UIC permitting program (joining North Dakota, Wyoming and Louisiana).
Should it be granted primacy over Class VI well permitting, the WVDEP will be able to issue such permits without following the lengthy (and oftentimes litigated) procedures required under the federal National Environmental Policy Act that applies to EPA-issued UIC permits. The WVDEP would also be in a better position to coordinate the issuance of such Class VI UIC wells with other West Virginia regulatory requirements for carbon dioxide injection projects, including the West Virginia Underground Carbon Dioxide Sequestration and Storage Act (W.Va. Code § 22B-1-1, et seq.). This would help facilitate the development of such projects by a variety of applicants, including those seeking to use underground carbon dioxide sequestration as a part of the production of so-called “blue” hydrogen (reforming fossil fuels to separate hydrogen and capture CO2) and those hoping to comply with proposed EPA rules mandating the use of carbon capture and injection technologies by certain natural gas and coal-fired power plants.
For questions about EPA’s proposal to grant primacy to West Virginia over the issuance of Class VI UIC wells or related issues, please contact Christopher B. (Kip) Power at (681) 265-1362 or cpower@babstcalland.com.
Click here, to view the article online in the January issue of GO-WV News.
Pittsburgh Technology Council
(by Chris Farmakis, Susanna Bagdasarova, Kate Cooper, and Dane Fennell)
As discussed in our previous Alert, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction in Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., et al. v. Garland, et al., temporarily halting enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) and its beneficial ownership information (BOI) reporting requirements, including the January 1, 2025, filing deadline. The ruling provided temporary relief to affected businesses, but a pending Department of Justice (DOJ) emergency motion to stay the injunction pending appeal has created further uncertainty.
On December 11 and December 13, 2024, the DOJ filed emergency motions with the District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit respectively, requesting a stay of the District Court’s nationwide injunction. In its motion to the Court of Appeals, the government proposed an expedited briefing schedule, requesting “a ruling on this motion as soon as possible, but in any event no later than December 27, 2024, to ensure that regulated entities can be made aware of their obligation to comply before January 1, 2025.”
On December 17, 2024, the District Court denied the government’s motion, while the Court of Appeals decision remains pending and could be issued as early as December 20, 2024. If the Fifth Circuit grants the stay or narrows the scope of the injunction, the CTA’s reporting requirements, including the January 1, 2025 filing deadline, could be reinstated (unless the court or the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issues a deadline extension). FinCEN has already clarified that businesses are not required to file BOI reports while the injunction is in effect, but that they may voluntarily submit reports during this time.[1]
If the Fifth Circuit stays the injunction, reporting companies which have not already submitted their filings should be prepared to finalize their BOI reports and file them promptly to meet the reinstated deadline. FinCEN has not indicated whether it plans to offer reporting companies an extension if the injunction is stayed or narrowed by December 27, 2024. Approximately 8 million of the estimated 32.6 million reporting companies subject to filing requirements have filed so far. In the event the January 1, 2025 deadline remains in place, FinCEN’s website is likely to be overwhelmed with filing attempts, which could lead to delays and technical issues. In light of this uncertainty, reporting companies should consider gathering the required filing information to avoid a potential race against the clock at year-end, or if your business has a conservative mindset, you should file the report now and enjoy the holiday season. Either way, doing nothing does not appear to be an option.
Babst Calland will continue to closely monitor developments on this matter. Please reach out to fincenassist@babstcalland.com or your Babst Calland client relationship lawyer if you have any questions.
[1] https://fincen.gov/boi
To view the full article, click here.
Firm Alert
(by Chris Farmakis, Susanna Bagdasarova, Kate Cooper, and Dane Fennell)
As discussed in our previous Alert, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction in Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., et al. v. Garland, et al., temporarily halting enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) and its beneficial ownership information (BOI) reporting requirements, including the January 1, 2025, filing deadline. The ruling provided temporary relief to affected businesses, but a pending Department of Justice (DOJ) emergency motion to stay the injunction pending appeal has created further uncertainty.
On December 11 and December 13, 2024, the DOJ filed emergency motions with the District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit respectively, requesting a stay of the District Court’s nationwide injunction. In its motion to the Court of Appeals, the government proposed an expedited briefing schedule, requesting “a ruling on this motion as soon as possible, but in any event no later than December 27, 2024, to ensure that regulated entities can be made aware of their obligation to comply before January 1, 2025.”
On December 17, 2024, the District Court denied the government’s motion, while the Court of Appeals decision remains pending and could be issued as early as December 20, 2024. If the Fifth Circuit grants the stay or narrows the scope of the injunction, the CTA’s reporting requirements, including the January 1, 2025 filing deadline, could be reinstated (unless the court or the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issues a deadline extension). FinCEN has already clarified that businesses are not required to file BOI reports while the injunction is in effect, but that they may voluntarily submit reports during this time.[1]
If the Fifth Circuit stays the injunction, reporting companies which have not already submitted their filings should be prepared to finalize their BOI reports and file them promptly to meet the reinstated deadline. FinCEN has not indicated whether it plans to offer reporting companies an extension if the injunction is stayed or narrowed by December 27, 2024. Approximately 8 million of the estimated 32.6 million reporting companies subject to filing requirements have filed so far. In the event the January 1, 2025 deadline remains in place, FinCEN’s website is likely to be overwhelmed with filing attempts, which could lead to delays and technical issues. In light of this uncertainty, reporting companies should consider gathering the required filing information to avoid a potential race against the clock at year-end, or if your business has a conservative mindset, you should file the report now and enjoy the holiday season. Either way, doing nothing does not appear to be an option.
Babst Calland will continue to closely monitor developments on this matter. Please reach out to fincenassist@babstcalland.com or your Babst Calland client relationship lawyer if you have any questions.
[1] https://fincen.gov/boi
PIOGA Press
(by Chris Farmakis, Susanna Bagdasarova, Kate Cooper, and Dane Fennell)
On December 3, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction temporarily halting enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA). With less than a month to go before the January 1, 2025 compliance deadline for entities formed prior to 2024, this ruling blocks the U.S. Department of Treasury from enforcing the requirements of the Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Rule (the “Rule”) issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
The Court’s opinion in Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., et al. v. Garland, et al. raises significant questions about the constitutionality of the CTA and its potential negative impact on small businesses. The CTA, part of broader anti-money laundering efforts, requires companies to disclose personal information about their “beneficial owners” (individuals who ultimately own or control a company) to a federal database maintained by FinCEN. In his Memorandum Opinion and Order, United States District Judge Amos L. Mazzant concluded that the CTA and Rule are likely unconstitutional as they exceed the scope of Congress’s power. The Court held that CTA does not regulate interstate commerce and that it is further not authorized by the Necessary and Proper clause of the Constitution.
The nationwide injunction affects most business entities in the U.S., as the CTA and Rule apply to approximately 32.6 million companies. Per the Court’s order, “reporting companies need not comply with the CTA’s January 1, 2025, BOI reporting deadline pending further order of the Court.”
While businesses are temporarily relieved of compliance obligations, the final resolution of the matter remains uncertain. Although no announcement has been made as of the time of this publication, the U.S. Department of Justice is likely to appeal the preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Companies should stay informed and be prepared for potential changes to enforcement.
Babst Calland will continue to closely monitor developments on this matter. Please reach out to fincenassist@babstcalland.com or your Babst Calland client relationship lawyer if you have any questions.
To view the full article, click here.
Reprinted with permission from the December 2024 issue of The PIOGA Press. All rights reserved.
The Legal Intelligencer
(by Michael Korns and Anna Hosack)
In Crawford v. Commonwealth, No. 19-EAP-2022 (Pa. Nov. 20, 2024), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of state preemptive firearm laws that prohibit municipalities from passing local gun regulations. Advocates for stricter gun laws filed a petition for review under the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, asking the Court to declare as unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful two statutory provisions that prohibit the enactment of local legislation on the subject: (i) Section 6120 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6120, and (ii) Section 2962(g) of the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, 53 Pa.C.S. § 2962(g). Generally, these provisions prohibit local governments from enacting or enforcing ordinances that regulate the ownership, transportation, possession, or transfer of firearms.
Crawford was heard en banc at the Commonwealth Court, and ultimately the Court sustained preliminary objections in a plurality decision and dismissed the petition for failure to state claims upon which relief could be granted (demurrer). Petitioners filed an appeal seeking review of the Commonwealth Court’s decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The City of Pittsburgh, the City of Scranton, and several other Pennsylvania local governments and officials submitted amici curiae briefs in support of the appeal.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed not only the delineation of power between the legislative and judicial branches of the state government but also the interplay between state and municipal governance. First, the decision emphasized the basic fact that municipalities in Pennsylvania are creatures of the state, created by state legislation and having no inherent powers of their own not granted or delegated by the Commonwealth. The Court reiterated that the General Assembly’s authority over municipalities’ powers is “supreme” and accordingly, municipalities may do only those things which the legislature has expressly or by necessary implication placed within their power to do.
The first law challenged by the Appellants was Section 2962(g) of the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law, 53 Pa.C.S. § 2962(g). Most municipalities are governed by one of four codes promulgated by the general assembly, the First and Second Class Township Codes, the Borough Code, and the Third Class City Code. However, Article IX, Section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, “Home Rule” allows a municipality to “legislate concerning municipal governance without express statutory warrant for each new ordinance; [a municipality’s] ability to exercise municipal functions is limited only by its home rule charter, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the General Assembly.” Generally speaking, this means that home rule communities can exercise any power that the General Assembly has not forbidden.
The Home Rule Law was enacted in 1996 and regulates the process for creating a home rule municipality, as well as setting boundaries on the powers that the municipality can exercise. It applies to all municipalities other than Philadelphia. In relevant part, Section 2962(c)(2) of the Home Rule Law provides that “[a] municipality shall not … exercise powers contrary to or in limitation or enlargement of powers granted by statutes which are applicable in every part of this Commonwealth.” The Appellants challenged the constitutionality of Section 2962(g) which specifically states that “[a] municipality shall not enact any ordinance or take any other action dealing with the regulation of the transfer, ownership, transportation or possession of firearms.” Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that the General Assembly may negate ordinances enacted by home rule municipalities when the General Assembly has enacted a conflicting statute concerning “substantive matters of substantive concern” including those involving “the health, safety, security and general welfare of all the inhabitants of the State” as opposed to matters of purely local concern which are of no concern to citizens elsewhere. The Supreme Court simply applied this long line of cases to this current challenge.
The second statute challenged, the Uniform Firearm Act, was originally enacted in 1972, and the General Assembly has subsequently demonstrated its state lawmaking power in the realm of firearm regulations through its numerous amendments to the Act over the course of decades. The stated intent of these amendments was to balance the right of Pennsylvania citizens to bear arms with the need for crime prevention and control. At dispute in this case, Section 6120 creates the general rule “no county, municipality or township may in any manner regulate the lawful ownership, possession, transfer or transportation of firearms, ammunition or ammunition components when carried or transported for purposes not prohibited by the laws of this Commonwealth.”
Appellants advanced three arguments in support of their case. First, the Appellants alleged that the State has violated their substantive due process rights to enjoy and defend life and liberty under Article 1, Section 1 including their right “to collectively enact measures that safeguard against gun violence” because the firearm protection laws do not provide due process rights. The Court found this argument failed because the substantive due rights given under Article 1, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides those rights to individuals, not a “collective” right of citizens or municipal corporation rights. A lawfully enacted prohibition on municipal power has no impact on individual due process rights.
Appellants second argument sought relief under the state-created danger doctrine. The “state-created danger” doctrine is a concept borne out of federal substantive due process principles that permits a plaintiff to obtain relief against a state actor for conduct that creates or increases a private danger that causes injury to a plaintiff. Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has endorsed the doctrine. This cause of action fails because even if endorsed, the doctrine only allows for individual claims based on injuries suffered due to state actions or failures to act. It has not been, and cannot be, invoked to render a statute unconstitutional on broad collective grounds.
Finally, the third argument was brought on behalf of Philadelphia alone, assets that the state through its absence of adequate statewide firearm regulations has improperly interfered with the public health responsibilities that the Commonwealth had delegated to political subdivisions under the Local Health Administration Law and Disease Prevention and Control Law of 1955. The Commonwealth Court plurality held that this claim failed because the term “public health” does not encompass the epidemic of gun violence and its attendant impacts. After applying the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the more specific firearm protection laws enacted later in time signal that Philadelphia has no delegated authority under the aforementioned laws to regulate firearms.
While these questions were highly contested in the Commonwealth Court, with a strongly worded dissent that would have found that the Appellants had stated a legally sufficient claim with respect to all three counts of the Petition, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s unanimous decision to dismiss the petition with prejudice appears to be a decisive answer to any further attempts to enact traditional firearm regulations by municipalities in the Commonwealth. The Court has stated with no ambiguity that regulations on ownership, sale, transfer, transportation or use are preempted by the State. However, there are currently lawsuits in various stages in the Pennsylvania Courts, asking the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to rule on several stalled local gun laws, including an assault rifle ban. In addition, there are additional pending lawsuits specifically challenging the limits of the preemption law in applicability to regulating the sale of “ghost gun” parts and the reporting of lost/stolen guns. Following Crawford, any future litigation over gun regulations would seem to be limited to questions regarding the reach of state Preemption laws, not whether they are in themselves unconstitutional. It is possible that some forms of regulation on ancillary issues may be possible, however, given the unanimous decision of the Court, it seems highly likely that gun regulation in Pennsylvania is an exclusively state issue, and further attempts at local regulations appear dubious, at best, given this decision. The Babst Calland Public Sector group will continue to monitor similar cases for further issues that may impact municipalities.
Michael T. Korns is senior counsel at Babst Calland Clements and Zomnir, P.C. and focuses his practice primarily on municipal permitting, planning, subdivision and land use, and zoning issues. He is also a member of the firm’s Energy and Natural Resources group. Contact him at 412-394-6440 or mkorns@babstcalland.com.
Anna R. Hosack is an associate at the firm and focuses her practice primarily on municipal and land use law. Contact her at 412-394-5406 or ahosack@babstcalland.com.
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Reprinted with permission from the December 13, 2024 edition of The Legal Intelligencer© 2024 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved.
Environmental Alert
(by Kip Power)
The federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recently proposed to approve the application of the State of West Virginia (through its Department of Environmental Protection (WVDEP)) to obtain primary authority (a.k.a., “primacy”) over the issuance of permits for Class VI underground injection wells located within its borders. 89 Fed. Reg. 93538 (Nov. 27, 2024). The federal rulemaking proposal may be found here. Comments on the proposed approval are due on or before December 30, 2024. On the same day, EPA will hold a public hearing on the proposal at the Charleston Marriott Town Center, 200 Lee Street East, in Charleston, West Virginia. Details regarding public participation in the rulemaking may be found here.
Class VI underground injection control (UIC) wells are those wells used for injecting carbon dioxide for the purpose of permanent geologic storage or “sequestration.” WVDEP’s rules for such permits are largely modeled on EPA’s detailed “Class VI” UIC regulations promulgated under the federal Safe Drinking Water Act. If approved, West Virginia will be just the fourth state to receive primacy over the Class VI UIC permitting program (joining North Dakota, Wyoming and Louisiana).
Should it be granted primacy over Class VI well permitting, the WVDEP will be able to issue such permits without following the lengthy (and oftentimes litigated) procedures required under the federal National Environmental Policy Act that applies to EPA-issued UIC permits. The WVDEP would also be in a better position to coordinate the issuance of such Class VI UIC wells with other West Virginia regulatory requirements for carbon dioxide injection projects, including the West Virginia Underground Carbon Dioxide Sequestration and Storage Act (W.Va. Code § 22B-1-1, et seq.). This would help facilitate the development of such projects by a variety of applicants, including those seeking to use underground carbon dioxide sequestration as a part of the production of so-called “blue” hydrogen (reforming fossil fuels to separate hydrogen and capture CO2) and those hoping to comply with proposed EPA rules mandating the use of carbon capture and injection technologies by certain natural gas and coal-fired power plants.
For questions about EPA’s proposal to grant primacy to West Virginia over the issuance of Class VI UIC wells or related issues, please contact Christopher B. (Kip) Power at (681) 265-1362 or cpower@babstcalland.com.
Pittsburgh Technology Council
(by Chris Farmakis, Susanna Bagdasarova, Kate Cooper, and Dane Fennell)
On December 3, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction temporarily halting enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA). With less than a month to go before the January 1, 2025 compliance deadline for entities formed prior to 2024, this ruling blocks the U.S. Department of Treasury from enforcing the requirements of the Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Rule (the “Rule”) issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
The Court’s opinion in Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., et al. v. Garland, et al. raises significant questions about the constitutionality of the CTA and its potential negative impact on small businesses. The CTA, part of broader anti-money laundering efforts, requires companies to disclose personal information about their “beneficial owners” (individuals who ultimately own or control a company) to a federal database maintained by FinCEN. In his Memorandum Opinion and Order, United States District Judge Amos L. Mazzant concluded that the CTA and Rule are likely unconstitutional as they exceed the scope of Congress’s power. The Court held that CTA does not regulate interstate commerce and that it is further not authorized by the Necessary and Proper clause of the Constitution.
The nationwide injunction affects most business entities in the U.S., as the CTA and Rule apply to approximately 32.6 million companies. Per the Court’s order, “reporting companies need not comply with the CTA’s January 1, 2025, BOI reporting deadline pending further order of the Court.”
While businesses are temporarily relieved of compliance obligations, the final resolution of the matter remains uncertain. Although no announcement has been made as of the time of this publication, the U.S. Department of Justice is likely to appeal the preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Companies should stay informed and be prepared for potential changes to enforcement. Babst Calland will continue to closely monitor developments on this matter. Please reach out to fincenassist@babstcalland.com or your Babst Calland client relationship lawyer if you have any questions.
To view the full article, click here.
Firm Alert
(by Chris Farmakis, Susanna Bagdasarova, Kate Cooper, and Dane Fennell)
On December 3, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted a nationwide preliminary injunction temporarily halting enforcement of the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA). With less than a month to go before the January 1, 2025 compliance deadline for entities formed prior to 2024, this ruling blocks the U.S. Department of Treasury from enforcing the requirements of the Beneficial Ownership Information Reporting Rule (the “Rule”) issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
The Court’s opinion in Texas Top Cop Shop, Inc., et al. v. Garland, et al. raises significant questions about the constitutionality of the CTA and its potential negative impact on small businesses. The CTA, part of broader anti-money laundering efforts, requires companies to disclose personal information about their “beneficial owners” (individuals who ultimately own or control a company) to a federal database maintained by FinCEN. In his Memorandum Opinion and Order, United States District Judge Amos L. Mazzant concluded that the CTA and Rule are likely unconstitutional as they exceed the scope of Congress’s power. The Court held that CTA does not regulate interstate commerce and that it is further not authorized by the Necessary and Proper clause of the Constitution.
The nationwide injunction affects most business entities in the U.S., as the CTA and Rule apply to approximately 32.6 million companies. Per the Court’s order, “reporting companies need not comply with the CTA’s January 1, 2025, BOI reporting deadline pending further order of the Court.”
While businesses are temporarily relieved of compliance obligations, the final resolution of the matter remains uncertain. Although no announcement has been made as of the time of this publication, the U.S. Department of Justice is likely to appeal the preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Companies should stay informed and be prepared for potential changes to enforcement. Babst Calland will continue to closely monitor developments on this matter. Please reach out to fincenassist@babstcalland.com or your Babst Calland client relationship lawyer if you have any questions.
The Legal Intelligencer
(by Casey Alan Coyle and Michael Libuser)
Over 100,000 cases have been brought against Monsanto Corporation nationwide, claiming its Roundup™ weed-killer contains a carcinogenic active ingredient, namely, glyphosate. Hundreds of such cases are pending in Pennsylvania alone. But for over 30 years, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has found evidence of glyphosate’s non-carcinogenicity for humans, and in 2015, the EPA determined “that glyphosate is not likely to be carcinogenic to humans.” EPA, “Glyphosate,” https://www.epa.gov/ingredients-used-pesticide-products/glyphosate.
This long-held conclusion regarding the non-carcinogenicity of glyphosate informed the EPA’s decision to approve a label for Roundup that omitted any cancer warning. By approving (and reapproving, over decades) Roundup’s label—pursuant to its authority under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (“FIFRA”)—the EPA effectively foreclosed litigants from asserting state-law product liability claims against Monsanto based on a purported duty to warn for failing to include a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. This is so because, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held in Schaffner v. Monsanto Corp., 113 F.4th 364 (3d Cir. 2024), FIFRA expressly preempts any such claims.
To many, Schaffner appeared to provide the last word on the subject. But some Pennsylvania state courts have declined to adhere to FIFRA-preemption in the wake of the decision. Last month, for example, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas concluded a trial—involving, in part, the same state-law failure-to-warn claim deemed preempted in Schaffner—resulting in a $78 million verdict for the plaintiffs. Melissen v. Monsanto Co., No. 210602578 (Phila. Cnty. C.C.P. Oct. 10, 2024). To borrow from Dickens, there appears to be a Tale of Two Courts within Pennsylvania—federal courts (where FIFRA-preemption applies), and state courts (where it does not)—resulting in, among other problems, discord, non-uniformity, confusion, and incentivization of forum-shopping.
FIFRA
FIFRA is a comprehensive regulatory statute that regulates pesticides and empowers the EPA to “supervise the pesticide industry” generally. Schaffner, 113 F.4th at 372. FIFRA prohibits manufacturers from misbranding pesticides, including by prohibiting them from omitting certain warnings or cautioning statements that, if complied with, are “adequate to protect health and the environment.” 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(1)(G). It also prohibits manufacturers from distributing or selling unregistered pesticides.
The EPA is tasked with determining whether to register a pesticide under FIFRA, a process that requires manufacturers to submit proposed labels for the pesticides, among other things. Once registered, a pesticide cannot be distributed or sold unless it retains the same composition and labeling as presented to the EPA during the registration process. Any manufacturer that modifies a pesticide’s preapproved label must apply for an amended registration; failure to do so bars the manufacturer from distributing or selling the pesticide. The EPA is also charged with reviewing pesticide registrations every 15 years. Notably, FIFRA contains a “uniformity” provision that prohibits states from imposing “any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter.” 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). This provision “mandates nationwide uniformity in pesticide labeling . . . .” Schaffner, 113 F.4th at 371 (emphasis added).
Schaffner
In Schaffner, a husband and wife sued Monsanto, claiming the husband’s use of Roundup as a professional landscaper and as a property owner caused him to develop non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and asserting a failure-to-warn claim under Pennsylvania law. Although they filed their claim in Pennsylvania state court, the case was removed to Pennsylvania federal court, transferred to a California federal court involved in multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) proceedings, and then transferred back to the same Pennsylvania federal court before being appealed to the Third Circuit. The MDL court rejected Monsanto’s argument that FIFRA precluded the couple from asserting a state-law failure-to-warn claim based on the Roundup label’s omission of a cancer warning. When the case returned to Pennsylvania—the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, specifically—the parties settled all aspects of the case excepting Monsanto’s FIFRA-preemption argument, which it expressly reserved for appeal.
On appeal, Monsanto prevailed on its FIFRA-preemption argument. In siding with Monsanto, the Third Circuit made several rulings that cast (arguably conclusive) doubt on any state-court proceedings that recognize a failure-to-warn claim premised on the omission of a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. At its core, Schaffner represents a straightforward application of FIFRA’s statutory framework and corresponding precedent. As the Third Circuit noted, preemption under Section 136v(b) of FIFRA—which, again, prohibits states from imposing different or additional labeling requirements than under FIFRA itself—applies if two conditions are met: (1) the state law imposes a requirement for “labeling or packaging”; and (2) that requirement is “in addition to or different from those required” under FIFRA. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 444 (2005). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a common-law duty to warn satisfies the first requirement. Id. at 446.
As to the second requirement, the parties in Schaffner sharply disagreed as to its applicability. This requirement implicates the Supreme Court’s “parallel requirements” test, under which “a state-law labeling requirement is not preempted if it is ‘equivalent to a requirement under FIFRA,’ while it is preempted if it ‘diverges from those set out in FIFRA and its implementing regulations.’” Schaffner, 113 F.4th at 379–380 (quoting Bates, 544 U.S. 452–453). The statute operates to preempt “any statutory or common-law rule that would impose [such] a labeling requirement[.]” Id. at 382. The test is a simple one—it requires courts to compare FIFRA’s labeling requirement to the state’s labeling requirement “to determine whether a pesticide label that violates the state requirement would also violate the federal one.” Id. at 380.
Applying this standard, the Third Circuit held that FIFRA preemption applied to bar the couples’ Pennsylvania failure-to-warn claim. The Court first had to identify the FIFRA labeling requirement to compare it to any state-law requirement. The Court concluded that the EPA’s “Preapproval Regulation,” i.e., the regulation that prohibited Monsanto from modifying Roundup’s label to include a cancer warning without further EPA approval, is the relevant FIFRA “requirement” for purposes of applying the parallel-requirements test. In doing so, the Court rejected the couples’ argument that it should only compare the Pennsylvania failure-to-warn “with the statutory definition of misbranding”—without regard to the Preapproval Regulation. The Third Circuit then applied the parallel-requirements test and found that, accepting the allegation that Monsanto violated Pennsylvania’s duty to warn by omitting a cancer warning on Roundup’s label, the omission did not violate the Preapproval Regulation given that Roundup’s previously approved label omitted a cancer warning. The test was therefore not satisfied because the FIFRA and state requirements are not equivalent, and accordingly, FIFRA preemption applied.
Subsequent Pennsylvania State Court Rulings
Despite Schaffner and its clear holding regarding FIFRA preemption vis-à-vis Roundup’s label, uncertainty has been sown by subsequent Pennsylvania state-court proceedings. One example is Melissen, which resulted in a nuclear verdict and is but one of hundreds of similar actions pending as part of the Roundup Products Liability cases in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. There, Monsanto moved for summary judgment, invoking Schaffner and seeking judgment in its favor on plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims under FIFRA preemption. The court denied the motion, along with Monsanto’s motion for a stay and request that the court certify the FIFRA-preemption issue for immediate appeal. Monsanto then filed an emergency application for permission to appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, but that, too, was denied.
Although Schaffner is not binding on Pennsylvania state courts, non-adherence to its holding is problematic for several reasons. For one, and as Melissen demonstrates, the Roundup cases have been catapulted into irreconcilable trajectories. In federal court, under Schaffner, the Melissens’ failure-to-warn claim would have been preempted; in Pennsylvania state court, it was not. Meanwhile, state courts in other jurisdictions have begun to follow Schaffner. See, e.g., Cardillo v. Monsanto Co., No. 2177CV00462, at 12–19 (Mass. Super. Oct. 21, 2024). This tension presents a classic Erie problem.
Moreover, ignoring Schaffner promotes discord and non-uniformity, which is doubly concerning in this context given FIFRA’s mandate of nationwide uniformity in pesticide labeling. It also clearly violates the statutory bar on states “imposing labeling requirements that are in addition to or different from the requirements imposed under FIFRA itself.” Schaffner, 113 F.4th at 371. If states can unilaterally decide when they can impose additional labeling requirements, e.g., cancer warnings not approved by the EPA, it would undermine FIFRA entirely.
And this raises still other concerns. States that decide to entertain failure-to-warn claims contra Schaffner will put manufacturers in the intractable position of having to decide between two competing alternatives: follow a federal statute aimed at promoting nationwide uniformity—or attempt to conform pesticide labels to predictions of what one or more states might ultimately require notwithstanding FIFRA. This dilemma implicates “conflict preemption,” which applies when “it is impossible to comply with both state and federal requirements,” or when “state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Roth v. Norfalco LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 374 (3d Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).
A related concern is forum shopping. “[P]art of the policy underlying preemption . . . is to prevent litigants from forum shopping to achieve a different result in federal court than they could obtain in state court.” Stone Crushed P’ship v. Kassab Archbold Jackson & O’Brien, 908 A.2d 875, 887 (Pa. 2006). If state courts refuse to apply preemption under Schaffner, litigants will have the ability to obtain relief in state court that they could not obtain in federal court.
Conclusion
It remains to be seen whether Schaffner will spell the end for the Roundup Products Liability litigation in Pennsylvania state courts. If not, courts across the Commonwealth will need to grapple with the strong policy concerns raised by permitting state-law failure-to-warn claims in the face of FIFRA.
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Casey Alan Coyle is a shareholder at Babst, Calland, Clements and Zomnir. He focuses his practice on appellate law and complex commercial litigation. Coyle is also a former law clerk to Chief Justice Emeritus Thomas G. Saylor of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Contact him at 267-939-5832 or ccoyle@babstcalland.com.
Michael Libuser is a litigation associate at the firm. He focuses his practice on appellate law and complex commercial litigation. Before entering private practice, Libuser served as a law clerk to Judge Yvette Kane, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and then Judge Karoline Mehalchick, U.S. District Judge for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Contact him at 717-868-8379 or mlibuser@babstcalland.com.
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Reprinted with permission from the December 5, 2024 edition of The Legal Intelligencer© 2024 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved.
FNREL Water Law Newsletter
(by Lisa M. Bruderly, Jessica Deyoe and Mackenzie M. Moyer)
On October 5, 2024, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) published notice of the final Erosion and Sediment Control General Permit for Earth Disturbance Associated with Oil and Gas Exploration, Production, Processing, or Treatment Operations or Transmission Facilities (ESCGP-4). See 54 Pa. Bull. 6341 (Oct. 5, 2024). ESCGP-4 became effective October 5, 2024, and will expire on October 5, 2029. The current ESCGP-3 is scheduled to expire on January 6, 2025, following an administrative extension from October 6, 2023. PADEP will continue to accept applications for ESCGP-3 until October 11, 2024.
There are several notable differences between ESCGP-3 and ESCGP-4. ESCGP-4 requires that if a discharge approved for coverage under ESCGP-4 subsequently exhibits a condition rendering it ineligible for coverage under the permit, ESCGP-4 requires the permittee to promptly take action to restore eligibility, notify PADEP in writing of the condition, and submit an individual erosion and sediment control permit application to PADEP if eligibility cannot be restored. ESCGP-3 had no such requirement for discharges that became ineligible after approval under the permit.
Under ESCGP-3, weekly inspections of controls were required, as well as inspections following stormwater events. ESCGP-4 adds an inspection requirement following “snowmelt sufficient to cause a discharge” and requires that inspections be documented using PADEP’s Chapter 102 Visual Site Inspection Report form (No. 3800-FM-BCW0271d) or a similar form that contains the same information. ESCGP-4 also requires that “qualified personnel, trained and experienced in erosion and sediment control and post-construction stormwater management” complete the required inspections and outlines requirements for such qualifications. Further, ESCGP-4 requires the initiation of repair or replacement of a best management practice or stormwater control measure (SCM) within 24 hours of discovery of an issue, if there is no likelihood of a pollutional incident. When there is a likelihood of a pollution incident, repair or replacement must occur immediately.
ESCGP-4 also requires that any SCM implemented by an operator that is not in PADEP’s Erosion and Sediment Pollution Control Manual (No. 363-2134-008) or the Water Quality Antidegradation Guidance (No. 391-0300-002) be approved by PADEP. Additionally, operators must document the implementation of each structural SCM using a PADEP form—“SCM Construction Certification Form” (No. 3800-FM-BCW0271j)—and submit this documentation to PADEP within 30 days of completion of construction.
Copyright © 2024, The Foundation for Natural Resources and Energy Law, Westminster, Colorado
FNREL Mineral and Energy Law Newsletter
Pennsylvania – Oil & Gas
(by Joe Reinhart, Sean McGovern, Matt Wood and Alexandra Graf)
On October 10, 2024, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) presented an update on and summary of OOOOc Rulemaking to the Bureau of Air Quality’s Air Quality Technical Advisory Committee (AQTAC). See PowerPoint Presentation, PADEP, “Emissions Guidelines (EGs) for Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions from Existing Crude Oil & Natural Gas Facilities (40 CFR Part 60 Subpart OOOOc)” (Oct. 10, 2024). On March 8, 2024, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized its rule targeting methane emissions from the oil and natural gas sector (the Methane Rule), which established new source performance standards (NSPS) for facilities built, modified, or reconstructed after December 6, 2022 (OOOOb), as well as emissions guidelines (EG) for states to follow in designing and executing state plans for existing sources (OOOOc). See Standards of Performance for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources and Emissions Guidelines for Existing Sources: Oil and Natural Gas Sector Climate Review, 89 Fed. Reg. 16,820 (Mar. 8, 2024) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). The Methane Rule applies to oil and gas facilities involved in production and processing (including equipment and processes at well sites, storage tank batteries, gathering and boosting compressor stations, and natural gas processing plants) and natural gas transmission and storage (including compressor stations and storage tank batteries). The Rule requires frequent monitoring and repair of methane leaks at well sites, centralized production facilities, and compressor stations using established inspection technologies or, at an operator’s selection, novel advanced detection technologies. OOOOb applies to affected facilities that begin construction, reconstruction, or modification after December 6, 2022, while OOOOc (as implemented by state programs) will apply to sources existing as of that same date. The main differences between OOOOb and OOOOc are the timeframe for compliance and the additional requirements for new wells, particularly relating to flaring and well completions.
Under 25 Pa. Code § 122.3, Pennsylvania will incorporate OOOOc by reference and adopt a State Plan based on the Model Rule. PADEP has until March 8, 2026, to submit the State Plan to EPA. The State Plan must document meaningful engagement, which includes input from PADEP advisory bodies, environmental justice communities, stakeholder outreach and discussion, and public hearings. After the State Plan is submitted, EPA has 60 days to determine completeness and then has one year to approve or disapprove the plan. Under the regulations, EPA has until May 2027 to approve the state plans. The projected compliance deadline for owners and operators will be the first quarter of 2029.
Notably, the Methane Rule has several key subparts. First, it aims to phase out venting and flaring of gas from oil wells because the most significant emissions reductions will come from this directive. The Methane Rule also creates the Super Emitter Program (SEP) for identifying and addressing significant methane leaks from production facilities, including an avenue for qualified third parties to alert EPA of owners and operators exceeding the emissions standards and for EPA to require owners/operators to investigate such alerts. A “super emitter” event is defined as emissions of 100 kg (220.5 pounds) of methane per hour or larger. Further, the Methane Rule is also applicable to storage vessels, as owners and operators of existing tanks or tank batteries will need to evaluate a new applicability trigger under OOOOc. Under the presumptive standard, for existing storage tanks or tank batteries with a potential to emit of 20 tons of methane per year or greater, owners/operators will have to reduce their emissions by 95%.
The Methane Rule also establishes new leak detection and repair (LDAR) requirements based on the type of facility involved, which generally includes well sites, centralized production facilities, and compressor stations where methane is emitted. Additionally, for well closure, fugitive emissions monitoring is required to continue until closure and, once closed, a final optical gas imaging survey must be performed. All pneumatic pump affected facilities in the oil and gas industry and pneumatic controllers must have zero emissions, and natural gas-driven pumps are prohibited except at facilities with fewer than three natural gas-driven diaphragm pumps in areas where other power sources are inaccessible. There are also new requirements for well liquids unloading, centrifugal compressors, reciprocating compressors, covers and closed vent systems, natural gas processing plant equipment leaks, and sweetening units.
Copyright © 2024, The Foundation for Natural Resources and Energy Law, Westminster, Colorado