On January 11, 2017, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held Section 301 of the Clean Streams Law “is a provision that prohibits acts or omissions resulting in the initial active discharge or entry of industrial waste into waters of the Commonwealth and is not a provision that authorizes the imposition of ongoing penalties for the continuing presence of an industrial waste in a waterway of the Commonwealth following its initial entry into the waterways of the Commonwealth.” EQT Production Co. v. Com., Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 485 MD 2014, slip op. at *24 (Jan. 11, 2017).
This case arose out of a release from an impoundment at a Marcellus Shale well pad site in Tioga County, Pennsylvania. It is undisputed that EQT stopped the source of the release within twelve days of reporting it on May 30, 2012 and thereafter entered the Act 2 program to achieve cleanup standards for soil and groundwater. In May 2014, the Department sought a non-negotiable penalty of $1.2 million for the release. EQT filed a complaint in Commonwealth Court in September 2014 challenging the Department’s use of a “continuing violation” theory to support this penalty calculation. Subsequently, in October 2014, the Department filed a Complaint for Civil Penalties with the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board, seeking a penalty of $4.5 million for the same release. The Department’s post-hearing brief in the EHB proceeding states that a penalty of nearly $470 million is supported by the Clean Streams Law.
The Department argued in the Commonwealth Court that “the illegal activity continues so long as the leaked industrial waste exists in any water of the Commonwealth” and that “the natural flow of waste from that water into another water of the Commonwealth” constitutes a new violation. Id. at *17-18. The Court noted that adopting the Department’s theory “would result in potentially limitless continuing violations for a single unpermitted release” and “would be tantamount to punishing a polluter indefinitely.” Id. at *20-21. The Court stated that the Department’s theory was “not supported by the statutory provisions and framework or the rules of statutory construction.” Id. at *20.
By clarifying the limits of the Department’s penalty authority to the days a waste or pollutant actually enters into groundwater or surface water, this precedential decision prevents the Department from threatening unauthorized civil penalties under the Clean Streams Law to leverage settlements in any context involving the Clean Streams Law, not just in the oil and gas industry.
In a recent op-ed published in the Post-Gazette, “Gas Pipelines Represent Prosperity” (Sept. 5 Perspectives), David Spigelmyer and James Kunz of the Marcellus Shale Coalition described the many benefits Read more ›
In Lutz et al. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-7549, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question submitted by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio as to whether Ohio follows the “at the well rule” or some version of the “marketable product” rule to calculate royalty payments made under an oil and gas lease. The “at the well rule” permits the lessee to deduct post-production costs from royalty payments made to the lessor. Conversely, the “marketable product” rule places limits on the lessee’s ability to deduct post-production costs under certain circumstances. Rather than adopting a blanket rule, the Court stated that the payment of royalties under a lease will be controlled by the specific language in the lease agreement. If an oil and gas lease is silent on the right to deduct post-production costs, it appears unlikely that Ohio courts will allow such deductions. The Court emphasized that leases should be viewed as contracts and the traditional rules for interpreting contractual terms should be used to determine the allocation of post-production costs under an oil and gas lease.
On October 14, the Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) published its Interim Final Rule (IFR) entitled “Pipeline Safety: Enhanced Emergency Order Procedures” in the Federal Register. The agency had previously issued a pre-publication version of this rule on October 4. See Babst Calland’s Pipeline Safety Alert. PHMSA will use these new regulations to implement its emergency order authority conferred by Congress in the “Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2016” (PIPES Act). PHMSA may issue an emergency order to address an unsafe condition or practice, or a combination of unsafe conditions or practices that pose an imminent hazard to public health and safety or the environment. The IFR contains administrative procedures that PHMSA must follow in determining if an imminent hazard exists, the factors that must be considered before PHMSA issues an emergency order, and the content of those orders, including a description of the persons subject to the restrictions, prohibitions, or safety measures and the standards and procedures for obtaining relief. The IFR also creates a process for administrative review of an emergency order that is largely patterned on the statutory text in 49 U.S.C. § 60117(o), including the referenced procedural rules for HazMat emergency orders in 49 C.F.R. § 109.19.
PHMSA may use this authority starting today, October 14. Interested parties may file comments on this final rule until December 13, 2016.
On October 14, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) published its Final Rule entitled “Expanding the Use of Excess Flow Valves in Gas Distribution Systems to Applications Other Than Single-Family Residences” (EFV Final Rule) in the Federal Register. The agency had previously issued a pre-publication version of this rule on October 7. See Babst Calland’s Pipeline Safety Alert. In response to statutory changes and a National Transportation Safety Board recommendation, PHMSA is expanding the existing requirement that operators install an excess flow valve (EFV) on certain natural gas distribution pipelines to include additional types of new or replaced service lines. The agency is also requiring curb valves or other manual shut-off valves on new or replaced service lines with meter capacities above 1,000 standard cubic feet per hour and requiring operators to notify customers of their right to request the installation of an EFV on certain types of service lines. The EFV Final Rule will become effective on April 14, 2017.
On Saturday October 8, 2016, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection’s new Chapter 78a regulations associated with unconventional wells went into effect when they were published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin. For unconventional well operators, there are substantial changes from prior law affecting operations over the entire life of the well, from permitting to site construction, waste handling, impoundments, pipelines, site restoration and spill remediation. For more information, check out our Administrative Watch.
On September 21, 2016, the Susquehanna River Basin Commission (SRBC) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking/Notice of Public Hearings in the Federal Register. The proposed regulations would affect application requirements for project approval and renewal, standards for the review of projects (including consumptive use mitigation proposals), and procedures for hearings and enforcement actions. There are also several proposed definitional changes. For example, the SRBC has proposed a new definition of “production fluids”, a term used throughout SRBC regulations applicable to unconventional natural gas projects.
Supplemental information about the rulemaking is available on the SRBC’s webpage. The SRBC has also scheduled informational webinars in October (11th and 17th), and four public hearings on the rulemaking later this year. Comments are due on the proposed rulemaking on or before January 30, 2017.
In connection with the proposed rulemaking the SRBC also issued a draft Consumptive Use Mitigation Policy, which describes the SRBC’s interpretation of proposed changes to consumptive use mitigation requirements. Written comments on the policy are due by January 6, 2017.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the last remaining challenged sections of Act 13 of 2012 to be invalid in an opinion issued September 28, 2016 in the Robinson Township v. Commonwealth line of cases. Read more about it in our Administrative Watch.
Today, the Ohio Supreme Court issued three written opinions interpreting the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (O.R.C. §5301.56) (the “ODMA”) and decided 10 related cases based upon its decisions set forth in the written opinions. Notably, in Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration L.L.C., (Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5796), the Supreme Court held that the 1989 version of the ODMA (the “1989 Act”) did not automatically abandon oil, gas and mineral rights in favor of the surface owner. Instead, the Supreme Court interpreted the statute to require the surface owner to seek a judicial decree that the mineral rights were abandoned. The Court focused on the statutory phrase “shall be deemed abandoned and vested in the owner of the surface” in determining that the legislature intended the 1989 Act to serve as a method of terminating abandoned mineral rights through a quiet title action rather than automatically transferring the mineral interests to the surface owner by operation of law. Additionally, the Court held that payment of delay rentals under a lease does not constitute a “title transaction” under Ohio law since the payment of delay rentals are not filed or recorded in the country recorder’s office.
In Walker v. Shondrick-Nau, Exr., (Slip Opinion No 2016-Ohio-5793), the Ohio Supreme Court built upon its decision in Corban and held that, if a surface owner failed to quiet title under the 1989 Act prior to the enactment of the 2006 version of the ODMA (the “2006 Act”), then the 1989 Act is unavailable and the surface owner can only pursue a claim to abandon mineral interests under the 2006 Act.
Finally, in Albanese, Exr. v. Batman et al., (Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5814), the Ohio Supreme Court followed the rationale of Corban regarding the necessity of filing an action to quiet title under the 1989 Act prior to the enactment of the 2006 Act. The Court further held that under the 2006 Act mineral rights cannot be deemed abandoned if the owner of the minerals had not been served notice of the abandonment pursuant to the 2006 Act. The notice requirement is mandatory under the 2006 Act.
Citing to the above cases, the Supreme Court decided 10 additional cases consistent with the three written opinions. The 10 cases are listed below:
Carney et al. v. Shockley et al., (Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5824)
Dahlgren et al. v. Brown Farm Prop. L.L.C., et al., (Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5818)
Eisenbarth et al. v. Reusser et al., (Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5819)
Farnsworth et al. v. Burkhart et al., (Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5816)
Swartz v. Householder et al., (Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5817)
Shannon et al. v. Householder et al., (Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5817)
Taylor et al. v. Crosby et al., (Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5820)
Thompson et al. v. Custer et al., (Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5823)
Tribett v. Shepherd et al., (Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5821)
Wendt et al. v. Dickerson et al., (Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-5822)
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recently issued Performance-Based Standards highlighting information that an applicant must include in order to seek a waiver of Part 107, the rules that apply to the operation of a small unmanned aircraft system. The FAA previously released the form and instructions on how to apply for a waiver from certain requirements (See previous Babst Calland pipeline safety alerts for more information on the Small UAS Final Rule and the waiver process.). Babst Calland’s Pipeline and HazMat Safety team has prepared a Pipeline Safety Alert noting observations on the Performance-Based Standards as they pertain to the line-of-sight requirement (14 C.F.R. § 107.31).
On August 29, 2016, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released the form and instructions on how to apply for a waiver from certain requirements included in the “Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems” Final Rule. This final rule went into effect on August 29, 2016, and permits the use, with certain limitations, of small unmanned aircraft systems (small drones) for non-hobby and non-recreational purposes. Babst Calland’s Pipeline and HazMat Safety team has prepared a Pipeline Safety Alert providing additional details on the application process.
Today, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) published an Advisory Bulletin entitled “Clarification of Terms Relating to Pipeline Operational Status.” Section 23 of the PIPES Act required PHMSA to issue an ADB within 90 days of enactment summarizing the procedures for changing the status of a pipeline facility from “active” to “abandoned”. Historically, PHMSA has stated that it does not recognize “idle” status for pipelines (only active or abandoned). PHMSA’s ADB introduces the concept of “purged but active” status, arguably a new category for operational status. The ADB states that PHMSA is considering a future rulemaking requiring operators to notify the agency of “purged but active” pipelines, but that in the meantime “owners or operators planning to defer certain activities for purged pipelines should coordinate the deferral in advance with regulators.” PHMSA’s guidance on integrity management currently allows deferral of certain inspection activities for out-of-service pipe.
On July 19, in Herder Spring Hunting Club v. Keller (Case No. 5 MAP 2015), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in a 5-0 decision to confirm the practice of “title washing” of unseated or unimproved land in Pennsylvania. Prior to January 1, 1948, “title washing” occurred through a tax sale of unseated land from which oil, gas and/or minerals (the “subsurface estate”) had been previously severed. If the subsurface estate had not been separately assessed, the tax sale of the unseated land would extinguish the prior severance and vest the tax sale purchaser with full ownership in the surface and subsurface estates. If the oil and gas had been separately assessed, then the tax sale of the surface would have no effect on the subsurface estate. After January 1, 1948, mineral estates were no longer separately assessed from the surface in Pennsylvania and title washing could no longer occur.
In Herder Spring, the Court held that a 1935 tax sale for unseated land which was subject to an unassessed 1899 subsurface severance conveyed both the surface and subsurface estates. Citing prior case law, the Court reasoned that, under the prior tax sale law, taxes on unseated land were against the land itself rather than any particular owner. The law placed a duty on the owner of a severed interest to notify the taxing authorities. Tax commissioners had no duty to search the deed records to discover severances relating to unimproved lands. Therefore, if the subsurface was never separately assessed, then the property would be assessed and taxed as a whole, and a tax sale thereunder would encompass the entire estate. Additionally, the Court pointed out that owners of the mineral estate had two years to challenge the tax sale or redeem the property, but failed to do so. The Court also rejected the Appellants’ due process and estoppel by deed argument.
The Court limited its holding in Herder Spring to a very narrow subset of cases and noted that its decision would not govern: (i) tax sales for assessments of surface or mineral rights only; (ii) tax sales where severances occurred after the tax assessment; or (iii) situations in which surface owners can meet the adverse possession standard.
Justice Todd filed a concurring opinion agreeing with the majority but for its position on Appellants’ due process claim that notice by publication of the tax sale was inadequate. According to Justice Todd, such claim was waived for purposes of this appeal because it was untimely raised.
On July 15, a Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania found that SWEPI LP (“SWEPI”) was obligated to pay bonuses under an oil and gas lease that it had surrendered prior to a 90 day title verification period. In Masciantonio , et al. v. SWEPI LP, the plaintiff-landowners executed oil and gas leases, with attached addenda, in favor of SWEPI for a primary term of five years. The leases stated “[i]n consideration of the bonus consideration paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,…Lessor does hereby grant…to Lessee,…the lands hereafter described for the purpose of exploring for, developing, producing and marketing oil, gas or their related substances.” The addenda included a payment provision stating that “[i]in consideration for the attached paid-up Oil and Gas Lease, Lessee hereby agrees to pay Lessor [$4,000.00] per net mineral acre. Payment shall be due within ninety (90) banking days of the Lessor presenting the Bank Draft to the financial institution of his/her/their choosing. All payment obligations are subject to title verification by Lessee.” SWEPI presented bank drafts to the plaintiffs, who presented them to their respective banks. Prior to 90 days thereafter, SWEPI decided to surrender the leases, due to a geohazard running through the leased premises and the presence of competitor leases covering neighboring lands. Upon surrender of the leases, SWEPI cancelled the bank drafts.
The plaintiffs brought suit for breach of contract, claiming that the obligation to pay the bonuses accrued immediately upon the parties executing the leases, and that the surrender did not extinguish SWEPI’s payment obligation. SWEPI countered with several arguments, all of which were rejected by the Court. First, SWEPI argued that the leases were ineffective, because the payment of the bonus was the sole consideration for the lease, without which the leases never went into effect. SWEPI also argued that the leases were subject to a condition precedent to formation and were ineffective unless and until SWEPI verified plaintiffs’ title to the property. The Court found that the language of the leases indicated that the actual consideration was the exchange of a bargained-for promise, not the immediate exchange of the value thereof. Similarly, the title verification condition operated as a condition precedent to the obligation to pay, not to the formation of the contracts. Therefore, the leases were valid and enforceable, despite the lack of bonus payment.
Next, the Court considered the two interpretations of the lease provisions presented by each party and determined that the plaintiffs’ interpretation was the more reasonable one. SWEPI argued that the contract terms allowed it to dishonor the bank drafts for any reason, or for no reason, until the expiration of the 90-day banking period. SWEPI presented language of industry standards, quoting Williams & Meyers’ Oil & Gas Law, which said that the use of a bank draft which will not become effective for a period of time subject to approval of title was often used by lessees to void a lease if they decided that conditions were no longer desirable. However, the Court found that the industry standards, including Williams & Meyers’, always provided that the precise language of the lease controlled and did not support an across-the-board provision that the use of a bank draft allows a lessee to void a lease for any reason until the expiration of a certain time period. The Court further stated that the language of the SWEPI leases consisted of an unequivocal agreement by SWEPI to pay the bonus and further provided a description of the time and manner in which it must do so. Therefore, the language did not provide SWEPI with the opportunity to avoid payment but instead bound SWEPI to pay, subject only to the condition of title verification. SWEPI was unable to present any meaningful evidence that it decided to surrender the leases due to a problem with plaintiffs’ title. On the contrary, plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence that they had good title to the leased premises. The Court further rejected the argument that the factors of geohazards and competitor activity on neighboring lands were part of the consideration of “title verification.” Those considerations were encompassed under the realm of a title “examination,” but not “title verification,” according to the plain meaning of such terms.
For those reasons, the Court held that SWEPI breached its obligation under the valid oil and gas leases and it was required to pay the bonus to the plaintiffs.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recently issued regulations permitting the use, with certain limitations, of small unmanned aircraft systems (small drones) for non-hobby and non-recreational purposes. On July 13, 2016, Congress passed several provisions specific to drone use by the energy industry as part of the reauthorization bill for the FAA. Babst Calland’s Pipeline and HazMat Safety team has prepared a Pipeline Safety Alert noting observations on some of the key provisions in the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016.